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Abstract
We nd that di¤erences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic
interaction imply di¤erences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulated the
availability of cognitive resources by applying a di¤erential cognitive load. In cognitive load
experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources,
in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources
required for the task implies that fewer such resources are available for deliberation on
the choice. In our experiment, subjects played a nitely repeated multi-player prisoners
dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects were
placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the
other were placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). According to two
di¤erent measures, we nd evidence that the low load subjects behaved more strategically.
First, the low load subjects exhibited more strategic defection near the end of play than
the high load subjects. Second, we nd evidence that low load subjects were better able
to condition their behavior on the outcomes of previous periods.
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There have been advancements in the understanding of play in games based on the concep-
tualization that players exhibit heterogenous levels of deliberation on their strategy (Stahl
and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta, 2001; Camerer,
Ho, and Chong, 2004). This conceptualization is often supported by observations of play in
a game and determining whether these models improve the t. In addition to comparing the
predictions with the observations, these models are also supported by the measurement of data
related to the level of cognition. For instance, studies measuring the decision to lookup relevant
and available information,1 eyetracking studies which measure the location of the attention of
the subjects,2 studies which examine the decision time of subjects,3 studies which use novel
methods in order to learn the distribution of strategic sophistication,4 studies which employ
measures of the cognitive ability of the subjects,5 and neurological studies6 have improved our
understanding of play in games.
In a rough sense, these experimental papers ask whether one can observe the e¤ects of
cognition on strategic behavior. In these studies, researchers perform a measure of cognition
or a measure related to the level of cognition and compare this with the observed behavior
in games. In this paper, we take a complementary approach. Rather than measure the
level of cognition or perform a measure related to the level of cognition, we manipulate the
level of cognition. This procedure has the advantage that, since we can randomly assign
subjects to a cognitive load treatment, we can mitigate the e¤ects of the heterogeneity of
the subjects.7 Although we do not study behavior which would provide direct evidence on
cognitive hierarchy models, similar to these papers, we are interested in examining the role
1See Camerer et al. (1993), Johnson et al. (2002), Crawford (2008), Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta
(2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006).
2Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2010) and Chen, Huang, and Wang (2010).
3For instance, Rubinstein (2007), Brañas-Garza, Meloso, and Miller (2012), Piovesan and Wengström
(2009), Frank (2010), Matthey and Regner (2011), and Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012). See Hogarth (1975)
for an early reference.
4See Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman (2013) and Burchardi and Penczynski (2013).
5For instance, see Bayer and Renou (2012), Brañas-Garza, Paz Espinosa, and Rey-Biel (2011), Carpenter,
Graham, and Wolf (2013), Devetag and Warglien (2003), and Gill and Prowse (2012).
6See Coricelli and Nagel (2009, 2012).
7We note that previous research has found a relationship between the e¢ cacy of the cognitive load manip-
ulation and the cognitive ability of the subject (Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf, 2013).
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of cognition in strategic outcomes. In this sense, our study is complimentary way of asking,
"Are there brains in games?"
In the experiment described below, we nd a relationship between the heterogenous ability
to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction and behavior in the interaction. This
heterogeneity arises because we apply a di¤erential cognitive load on subjects who are playing
the game. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a memorization
task in parallel to making a choice in another domain. This additional memorization task
occupies cognitive resources which cannot be devoted to deliberation on the choice. In this
sense, the condition of subjects under a larger cognitive load could be thought of as similar to
the condition of subjects with a diminished ability to reason.
Much is known about the behavior of subjects under a cognitive load. For instance, the
literature nds that subjects under a larger cognitive load tend to be more impulsive and less
analytical. However, there are only a few studies which examine the e¤ects of cognitive load
on behavior in strategic games.8 ;9 One objective of this study is to contribute to the literature
which examines the relationship between cognitive load and behavior in games, by studying
behavior in the repeated multi-player prisoners dilemma.
In our experiment, we imposed a cognitive load on subjects while they were playing a
nitely repeated four-player prisoners dilemma game.10 In each period, subjects were told
to memorize a number. In the low load treatment, this was a small number and therefore
relatively easy to remember. In the high load treatment, this was a large number and therefore
relatively di¢ cult to remember. The subjects then played the game. After the subjects made
their choice in the game, they were asked to recall the number. As suggested above, subjects
in the low load condition were better able to commit cognitive resources to deliberation on
8See Allred, Du¤y, and Smith (2013), Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2011), Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf
(2013), Milinski and Wedekind (1998), and Roch et al. (2000). Below, we discuss these in greater detail.
9Researchers have also studied the e¤ects of the contraints on the complexity of strategies on outcomes in
the nitely repeated prisoners dilemma game. For instance, see Neyman (1985, 1998). Also see Béal (2010)
for a more recent reference. Our study can be regarded as a similar exercise, but in the laboratory.
10See Komorita et al. (1980). We employ this version because the game is relatively simple, as the decision
is binary and the game is linear. On the other hand, the four-player version requires more thought than the
two-player version because outcomes depend on the actions of three opponents, rather than just one opponent.
Additionally, we were concerned that the subjects could be familiar with the two-player version and would
import prior experience into the experiment. The four-player version seems to strike the appropriate balance
among these concerns.
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their action in the game.
We nd that the subjects in the low load condition exhibited more strategic defection near
the end of play than those in the high load treatment.11 We also nd that low load subjects
were better able to condition their strategy on previous outcomes. Our paper contributes to
the cognitive load literature in that we nd that subjects under a high cognitive load are less
strategic according to these two measures. Our paper also contributes to the literature on
measures of cognitive ability and strategic behavior. To the extent that the cognitive load
manipulation a¤ects the cognitive ability of the subject, our results would suggest a negative
relationship between measures of cognitive ability and both end-of-game defection and the
ability to condition play on previous outcomes in the nitely repeated multi-player prisoners
dilemma.
1.1 Related literature
The cognitive load literature nds that subjects under a larger cognitive load tend to be more
impulsive and less analytical. These di¤erences in behavior stem from the fact that those
under a larger cognitive load are less able to devote cognitive resources to reect on their
decision. For instance, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) described an experiment in which subjects
were given an option of eating an unhealthy cake or a healthy serving of fruit. The authors
found that the subjects were more likely to select the cake when they were under a high
cognitive load.
Much is known about how the cognitive load manipulation a¤ects subjects in nonstrategic
settings. In addition to being more impulsive and less analytical (Hinson, Jameson, and
Whitney, 2003) it has been found that subjects under a cognitive load tend to be more risk
averse and exhibit a higher degree of time impatience (Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro, 2013),
make more mistakes (Rydval, 2011), have less self control (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward
and Mann, 2000), fail to process available information (Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull, 1988;
Swann et al., 1990), perform worse on gambling tasks (Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney, 2002),
11These results near the end of the game were also found by Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Keser and van
Winden (2000).
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are more susceptible to a social label (Cornelissen et al., 2007), make di¤erent choices in
allocation decisions (Cornelissen, Dewitte, and Warlop, 2011; Hauge et al., 2009, Schulz et al.,
2012), and have di¤erent evaluations of the fairness of outcomes (van den Bos et al., 2006).12
The cognitive load manipulation is e¤ective because it occupies a portion of the working
memory of a subject. Working memory is the capacity to temporarily store information so that
it can be processed or manipulated. A strong relationship has been found between working
memory capacity and measures of cognitive ability (Burgess et al., 2011; Conway, Kane, and
Engle, 2003; Süßet al., 2002). In fact, research suggests that training designed to improve
working memory can improve the cognitive ability of both humans and mice.13 Therefore, a
reduction of the available working memory capacity of the subject can be thought of as similar
to the condition of having a diminished ability to reason.
To our knowledge, there are only a few papers which investigate the relationship between
the manipulation of cognitive load and behavior in games. Roch et al. (2000) found that
subjects in the low cognitive load condition requested more resources in a common resource
game. However, in Roch et al. the subjects were not told the penalty if the sum of the groups
requests exceeded the amount to be divided. As a result, one cannot determine whether
the cognitive load manipulation implied di¤erences in strategic behavior or di¤erences in the
regard for instructions which are not incentivized.
Milinski and Wedekind (1998) studied the e¤ect of the cognitive load manipulation on
behavior in the repeated prisoners dilemma game, without a denite last period. The authors
found that most subjects under a low cognitive load conditioned their play on the opponents
action in the previous period, in addition to their own action in the previous period. In
contrast, many high load subjects simply conditioned their play on their opponents previous
action. The authors also found that low load subjects were better able than high load subjects
to remember the outcome of the game two periods in the past.14 We also nd that low load
12Although most cognitive load studies investigate a single e¤ect at a time, Deck and Jahedi (2013) examine
several e¤ects at a time. The authors found that subjects under a cognitive load are less patient, more risk
averse, perform worse on arithmetic tasks, and are more prone to anchoring e¤ects.
13See Conway and Getz (2010).
14Although we note that Milinski and Wedekind (1998) dis not investigate the extent to which behavior was
a¤ected by outcomes two periods in the past.
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subjects condition their play on a larger number of variables related to previous outcomes.
While we do not nd a di¤erence between the ability to condition on outcomes one period in
the past, we do nd that low load subjects are better able to condition their play on outcomes
two periods in the past.
Cappelletti, Güth, and Ploner (2011) studied behavior in the ultimatum game and varied
the ability of subjects to deliberate, by manipulating both time pressure and cognitive load.
The authors found that cognitive load did not a¤ect behavior as either a proposer or respon-
der.15 In contrast, we nd that cognitive load a¤ected strategic behavior. The di¤erence in the
e¢ cacy of the cognitive load manipulation is likely due to the di¤erences in its incentivization.
We further discuss this issue below.
Additionally, Allred, Du¤y, and Smith (2013) performed a within-subject analysis of the
e¤ect of cognitive load on various simultaneous games which were designed to measure the
strategic sophistication of the subjects. Similarly, Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013) in-
duced a di¤erential cognitive load in subjects then observed play in a pair of strategic games.
Carpenter et al. found that subjects under a high cognitive load were less strategic, in general,
and less able to perform backwards induction, in particular. We nd a similar result in that
subjects under a high cognitive load exhibited less strategic defection near the end of play.
There is a recent interest in the relationship between cognitive ability and preferences.16
This literature largely nds a negative relationship between cognitive ability and both risk
aversion and time impatience. We note the similarities between the ndings in the cognitive
ability literature and those in the cognitive load literature. There is also a recent interest in
the relationship between measures of cognitive ability and behavior in games.17 For instance,
Burnham et al. (2009) found a relationship between a measure of cognitive ability and strategic
15 In a related paper, Buckert, Oechssler, and Schwieren (2013) found that both time pressure and cognitive
load a¤ect behavior in a repeated Cournot oligopoly game.
16See Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro (2013), Brañas-Garza, Guillen, and Lopez del Paso (2008), Burks et
al. (2008), Dohmen et al. (2010), Frederick (2005), and Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2009). See Ben-Ner,
Kong, and Putterman (2004), Branstätter and Güth (2002), Chen et al. (2013) and Millet and Dewitte (2007)
for more on the relationship between social preferences and measures of intelligence.
17Also see Ballinger et al. (2011), Baghestanian and Frey (2012), Bayer and Renou (2012), Brañas-Garza,
Garcia-Muñoz, and Hernan Gonzalez (2012), Brañas-Garza, Paz Espinosa, and Rey-Biel (2011), Carpenter,
Graham, and Wolf (2013), Chen, Du, and Yang (2013), Gill and Prowse (2012), Jones (2013), Palacios-Huerta
(2003), Putterman, Tyran, and Kamei (2011), Rydval (2011), and Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011). For a
related study, see Arruñada, Casari, and Pancotto (2012).
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behavior in a beauty contest game. Jones (2008) found a relationship between cooperation
in the repeated prisoners dilemma and the average SAT scores at the university where the
experiment was conducted.18 Devetag and Warglien (2003) found a relationship between the
measured working memory capacity of a subject and the congruence of play to equilibrium
behavior. We contribute to this literature by manipulating cognition, rather than by measuring
cognition, and examining its a¤ect on strategic behavior.19
2 Method
2.1 Discussion of the experimental design
Although the cognitive load manipulation is common, most cognitive load manipulations are
not repeated.20 As a result, it was not obvious to us whether we should balance the experiment
so that each subject would undergo the high and low loads an equal number of times. However,
we decided to keep the subjects in a single treatment throughout the experiment. In part,
this decision was due to the results in Dewitte et al. (2005) which report that the e¤ects of
the cognitive load manipulation can be lasting. Also note that we decided to use a 7 digit
number as the high load manipulation because it is standard in the literature and because
Miller (1956) found that this tends to be near the limit of the memory of subjects.21
The bulk of the cognitive load literature does not incentivise the memorization task.22
Benjamin et al. (2012), Cappelletti et al. (2011), Carpenter et al. (2013), and Schulz et al.
(2012) are examples of experiments with such material incentives. Cappelletti et al. (2011)
paid the subjects per correct digit. On the other hand, we paid the full amount earned in the
game for correct recall and we paid nothing for incorrect recall. However, like Cappelletti et
al. (2011), we did not provide feedback regarding the accuracy of the memorization task. We
18See Rydval and Ortmann (2004) for a similar result.
19Somewhat related to our approach, Bednar et al. (2012) describe an experiment in which subjects simul-
taneously played two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. The authors found that behavior in a particular
game was a¤ected by the corresponding paired game. Also see Savikhina and Sheremeta (2013).
20See Hinson et al. (2002), Hinson et al. (2003), and Schulz et al. (2012) for exceptions.
21Also, see Cowan (2001) for more recent view on the memory capacity literature.
22Although there is evidence that subjects perform better on tasks which require attention when the tasks
are incentivized. See Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
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made these two design decisions in order to reduce the ability of the subjects to strategically
allocate cognitive resources.23
Also note that we designed the experiment so that the subject would only enter the follow-
ing stage when each player completed the preceding stage. This was done in order to mitigate
the ability of the subjects to strategically decide the timing of their decisions. Due to our
design, there was little incentive for the subjects in the low load condition to quickly leave the
stage where they were given the number. Additionally, the subjects in the high load condition
could not quickly make their decision in the prisoners dilemma game, in order to spill their
number in the memorization task. We suspect that our results would be stronger if we allowed
subjects to immediately proceed to the subsequent stage.
2.2 Experimental design
A total of 48 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were graduate and un-
dergraduate students at Rutgers University-Camden. The experiment was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects were matched with three other subjects and they played a repeated prisoners
dilemma game. The subjects were told that the group would remain xed throughout the
experiment.24 The subjects were given no information about the composition of their group.
The individual decision was to select X (the cooperative action) or Y (the uncooperative
action). Of the four subjects in the group, if x subjects play X then selecting X yields a
payo¤ of 20x points whereas selecting Y yields 20x+ 40. The exchange rate was $1 for every
150 points. Additionally, the subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee. While making a decision in
the game, the subjects were provided with the payo¤s in two logically equivalent formats.25
23Another means of incentivising the cognitive load, without inducing possible di¤erences in payment, is
to pay the subjects based on the rank of correct answers within their treatment. While this procedure has
the advantage that payments across treatments would be equal, in our view this is less satisfactory than our
design. First, in order to make these instructions comprehensible in a session with both treatments, we would
have to explain to the subjects that there are di¤erent cognitive load treatments. Second, we could avoid
informing subjects of the di¤erent treatments by running sessions with only a single treatment. However,
given the between-subject nature of the experimental design, we worried that this might introduce additional
heterogeneity between the treatments.
24The instructions were given via power point slides. The slides, along with any experimental material, are
available from the corresponding author upon request.
25See the appendix for the screen shown to the subjects during their decision in the game.
8
Before play in each period, the subjects were given 15 seconds to commit a number to
memory. The subjects were aware that they would be asked to recall the number after their
choice was made in the game. There were two cognitive load treatments: in the low load
treatment, subjects were directed to memorize a 2 digit number, and in the high load treat-
ment, subjects were directed to memorize a 7 digit number. There were 20 subjects in the low
load treatment and 28 in the high load treatment. The groups were homogenous in that they
contained only a single load treatment. The subjects were told that they would only receive
payment in the periods in which they correctly recalled the number. After each period, sub-
jects were given feedback regarding play in the game, however they were not given feedback
about their performance on the memorization task.
To summarize the timing in each period, subjects were given the number (7 digits or 2
digits), they made their choice in the game, they were asked to recall the number, and they
were given feedback on the game outcome but not on the memorization task outcome. This
procedure was repeated for 30 periods, with a new number in each period. The average amount
earned was $14:86.
At the conclusion of period 30, the subjects answered the following manipulation check
questions on a scale of 1 to 7: Which featured into your decisions between X and Y , your
prudent side or your impulsive side (1 prudent, 7 impulsive)? How di¢ cult was it for you to
recall your numbers (1 very di¢ cult, 7 not very di¢ cult)? How di¢ cult was it for you to decide
between X and Y (1 very di¢ cult, 7 not very di¢ cult)? How distracting was the memorization
task (1 very distracting, 7 not very distracting)? and How many of the memorization tasks
do you expect that you correctly answered (1 none correct, 7 all correct)?
3 Results
3.1 Manipulation checks and an overview of the data
The manipulation check questions demonstrated some evidence of di¤erences between the
high and low load treatments. Specically, those in the high load treatment reported hav-
9
ing signicantly more di¢ culty in recalling the number (Z = 3:75, p < 0:001),26 found the
memorization task to be signicantly more distracting (Z = 3:79; p < 0:001), and expected
to correctly recall the number with a signicantly lower precision (Z = 2:74, p = 0:006) than
those in the low load treatment. There is not a signicant di¤erence in the reported di¢ culty
in deciding on an action in the game (Z = 1:10, p = 0:27) or in the reported impulsiveness
(Z =  0:94, p = 0:34). The subjects in the high load treatment spent a signicantly longer
time27 committing the number to memory (M = 9:08, SD = 4:99) than the subjects in the
low load treatment (M = 1:31, SD = 2:28), Z(840,600) = 28:35, p < 0:001.
Despite its di¢ culty, we are surprised by the success of the high load subjects on the
memorization task. In the high load treatment, 676 of the 840 (80:5%) of the memorization
tasks were preformed correctly. By comparison, 592 of 600 (98:7%) of the memorization tasks
in the low load were preformed correctly.
Finally, we provide an overview of the rates of cooperation in the experiment. In Figure 1,
we show the average cooperation rates by cognitive load treatment across periods. In Figure
2, we show the cooperation rates of each of the 12 groups across periods. In Table 1, we list
the rates of cooperation by treatment in blocks of periods and the aggregate data.
<<Figures 1 and 2 about here>>
Table 1. Cooperation rates by treatment and period
Periods 1  5 6  10 11  15 16  20 21  25 26  30 Total
High load treatment 0:521 0:386 0:364 0:343 0:329 0:357 0:383
Low load treatment 0:540 0:410 0:510 0:440 0:360 0:210 0:412
Z-statistic 0:282 0:377 2:246 1:522 0:504  2:456 1:084
p-value 0:78 0:71 0:025 0:128 0:61 0:014 0:28
We report the results of Mann-Whitney tests for the di¤erence between the
cooperation rates for the high and low load treatments. We perform these tests on
blocks of 5 periods and also on the aggregate data. The former tests have n1 = 140
and n2 = 100, whereas the latter test has n1 = 840 and n2 = 600.
26These are the results of two-sided Mann-Whitney tests between the high and low load subjects, where
n1 = 28 and n2 = 20.
27The z-Tree output specied the time remaining when the Click to Proceed button was pressed. However,
there were instances where the output suggested that the decision was made with 99999 seconds remaining.
This output seems to have occurred if the "Click to Proceed" button was pressed before the clock could begin.
In the stage in which the number was given to the subjects, we recoded the 56 instances of the 99999 output
as 16, because 15 seconds were allotted.
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Table 1 suggests that there does not exist a large di¤erence between the overall rates of
cooperation of the high and low load subjects. When considering the periods in blocks of 5
or the aggregate data, we only nd signicant di¤erences between the treatments in the nal
5 periods, where the low load subjects cooperated less, and between periods 11   15, where
the low load subjects cooperated more. The former suggests that, as the end of the game
approached, the low load subjects played more strategically than the high load subjects. The
latter suggests that, despite that they were to be less cooperative near the end of the game,
low load subjects exhibited an elevated rate of cooperation for intermediate periods. In other
words, there is evidence of rational cooperation by the low load subjects. To investigate this
further, we test for evidence of rational cooperation in periods 1   25. We nd that when
excluding the last 5 periods, the low load subjects (M = 0:452, SD = 0:498) exhibited more
cooperation than the high load subjects (M = 0:389, SD = 0:488), Z(700,500) = 2:198,
p = 0:028.
3.2 Di¤erences in behavior
Here, our dependent variable obtains a value of 1 if the cooperative action (X) was selected
and 0 otherwise. We use a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the subject was in the low
load treatment and 0 otherwise. We also use a dummy variable indicating whether the period
was within the last 5 periods.
We note the panel nature of our data, consisting of repeated binary decisions of subjects
in xed groups. In order to account for this, we perform random-e¤ects repeated measures
logistic regressions. Our analysis assumes an exchangeable log odds ratio, clustered by group
and subclustered by subject. In other words, we assume a constant log odds ratio relating
any two observations involving a particular subject. We also assume a constant log odds
ratio involving two di¤erent subjects in the same group. However, observations involving two
di¤erent subjects in di¤erent groups are considered to be independent. The regressions are
estimated using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE). Since GEE is not a likelihood-
based method, Akaikes Information Criterion is not available. Therefore we provide the
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Quasilikelihood information criterion (QIC).28 See Table 2 for the results of these regressions.
Table 2. Logistic regressions of cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period  0:0327  0:0226  0:0315  0:0345
(0:0066) (0:0105) (0:0066) (0:0103)
Last 5    0:0498 0:344 0:390
(0:181) (0:0861) (0:0895)
Low load   0:436 0:263 0:175
(0:2198) (0:202) (0:239)
Last 5-Low load Interaction      1:003  1:108
(0:233) (0:261)
Period-Low load Interaction    0:0210   0:0070
(0:0107) (0:0123)
QIC 1915:84 1921:73 1913:09 1914:05
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
** indicates signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates signicance at 0.01. Each
regression accounts for the repeated observations by assuming an exchangeable
log odds ratio clustered by group and subclustered by subject. Each regression
has 1440 observations from 48 subjects in 30 periods. QIC refers to the Quasi-
likelihood information criterion.
There is evidence of convergence to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) pre-
diction. In every specication involving the period, our results indicate that subjects played
less cooperatively across time. In regression (2), the signicance of the Low load variable
suggests evidence of rational cooperation by the low load subjects. However, this relationship
is not signicant in regressions (3) and (4). This lack of signicance stands in contrast to the
rational cooperation results of the Mann-Whitney test over periods 1  25. We also nd that
the actions of the subjects in the low load treatment exhibited signicantly more strategic
defection near the end of play. We summarize this analysis with the following result.
Result 1 Across both treatments, behavior converged to the SPNE behavior. Additionally,
the subjects in the low load treatment exhibited signicantly more strategic defection near
the end of play.
28For more on QIC, see Pan (2001).
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3.3 Di¤erences in cognitive resources or di¤erences in expected payments?
One alternate explanation for the di¤erence in the behavior of the subjects in the high and low
load treatments relates to the possible di¤erence in the expected payments across treatments.
Although it would seem di¢ cult to argue that Result 1 was driven by a di¤erence in payment
expectations, we nonetheless explore this explanation. While it is not possible to determine
the precise di¤erence in the payment expectations, it is possible to look for evidence that the
di¤erence in behavior was motivated by the income e¤ect rather than the cognitive load.
One possibility is that the subjects in the high load treatment completely forgot the num-
ber, and therefore selected the action in the game with the knowledge that they would not
receive payment in that period. If this was the case then we would expect to see subjects
having quickly entered an incorrect number so that they could use this additional time to rest
and therefore perform better in the subsequent period. Here we look for evidence that high
load subjects quickly entered incorrect responses on the memorization task. In Table 3, we
summarize the relationship between the memorization task and the time remaining when the
stage was exited. We provide the number of correct responses, the number of total responses,
and the percent correct by the time remaining when the stage was exited. Recall that subjects
were given 15 seconds in which to provide the number.29
Table 3. The number of correct memorization task responses, total responses, and
percent correct by time remaining and treatment
Time Remaining 14 or more 13 or 12 11 or 10 9 or 8 7 or 6 5 or less
Correct 21 302 227 72 36 18
High load Total 22 331 281 102 52 52
treatment Percent 95:5% 91:2% 80:8% 70:6% 69:2% 34:6%
Correct 337 214 28 11 1 1
Low load Total 342 214 29 12 1 2
treatment Percent 98:5% 100% 96:6% 91:7% 100% 50:0%
In Table 3, we observe that relatively few incorrect responses to the memorization task
occurred early in the stage. This suggests that it was not common for the subject to leave the
29As above, we recorded 5 instances of the time remaining output of 99999. This output seems to have
occurred if the "Click to Proceed" button was pressed before the clock could begin. We recoded these as 16,
because 15 seconds were allotted.
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game stage having forgotten the number because there is evidence that the subjects exerted
e¤ort to correctly perform the memorization task. The data summarized in Table 3 seems to
be consistent with the hypothesis that the subjects in both treatments attempted to correctly
perform the memorization task, although the high load subjects took longer and did so with
less success.
While the results of Table 3 suggest that the subjects attempted to correctly respond to
the memorization task, it is possible that response times would not capture the perceived
likelihood of payment. To account for this possibility, we employ a di¤erent measure of the
subjects expectation of payment in that period: whether the subject correctly responded to
the memorization task in that period. Here we preform an analysis, similar to that summarized
in Table 2, with the exception that we include a variable Correct, which assumes a value of 1
if the memorization task in that period was performed correctly, and 0 otherwise. We present
a summary of this analysis in Table 4.
Table 4. Logistic regressions of cooperation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period  0:0326  0:0226  0:0315  0:0345
(0:0066) (0:0104) (0:0066) (0:0102)
Last 5    0:0497 0:344 0:389
(0:1809) (0:0859) (0:0924)
Low load   0:452 0:277 0:190
(0:226) (0:221) (0:248)
Last 5-Low load Interaction      1:003  1:106
(0:234) (0:264)
Period-Low load Interaction    0:0210   0:0069
(0:0106) (0:0122)
Correct  0:0594  0:0813  0:0733  0:0714
(0:231) (0:244) (0:243) (0:242)
Correct p-value 0:80 0:74 0:76 0:77
QIC 1919:0426 1924:44 1915:88 1916:84
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
** indicates signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates signicance at 0.01. Each
regression accounts for the repeated observations by assuming an exchangeable
log odds ratio clustered by group and subclustered by subject. Each regression
has 1440 observations from 48 subjects in 30 periods. QIC refers to the Quasi-
likelihood information criterion.
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First, we note that Result 1 is not a¤ected by the presence of the Correct variable. Given
our measure of the condence that the subject would correctly perform the memorization
task in that period, we still observe more strategic defection near the end of play from the
low load subjects. Second, we note that the Correct variable is not signicant in any of
the regressions. Hence, there does not appear to be a relationship between cooperation and
successful performance of the memorization task in that period. Finally, we note that the
evidence of rational cooperation, based on the signicance of the Low load variable, is similar
to that found in Table 2.
Alternatively, we could account for the possibility of di¤erences in the expectations of pay-
ment by excluding observations in which the subject incorrectly performed the memorization
task. Consider an analysis similar to that summarized in Table 2, with the exception that we
only include the 1268 observations in which the memorization task was performed correctly
in that period. These results are qualitatively similar to that summarized in Table 4.30 In
light of this analysis, we o¤er the following result.
Result 2 We do not nd evidence that the subjects were motivated by a di¤erence in
payment rather than a di¤erence in cognitive load.
3.4 Di¤erences in ability to condition on previous outcomes
Now we explore another measure of strategic behavior: whether the low load subjects were
better able to condition their play on past outcomes. In order to investigate this possibility,
we o¤er a model of cooperation which is possibly dependent on previous outcomes. In the
analysis described below, we assume that the subject considered features of these previous
outcomes to be state variables upon which play could be conditioned.
We describe the variables upon which the subject could condition. One possibility is that
the subject could condition play in period t on the number of other players in the group who
played cooperatively in the previous period. We refer to this variable as Others X in t   1.
Note that this variable can range from 0 to 3. Another possibility is that the subject could
30This analysis is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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condition play in period t on their own action in the previous period. We refer to this variable
as Subject X in t 1. This variable obtains a 1 if the subject cooperated in the previous period
and a 0 otherwise. We also include the interaction between Others X in t 1 and Subject X in
t  1. In addition to these variables with a one period lag, we also include the corresponding
variables with a two period lag, which are denoted by t  2.
Similar to Milinski and Wedekind (1998) we investigate the extent to which the other
cooperators in the previous period and the subjects own behavior in the previous period can
a¤ect behavior. However unlike Milinski and Wedekind (1998), we also study the extent to
which the corresponding variables with a two period lag a¤ect behavior.
As above, we employ a random-e¤ects repeated measures analysis clustered by group and
subclustered by subject with an exchangeable log odds ratio. In regressions (1)-(3), we restrict
attention to the high load subjects. In regressions (4)-(6), we restrict attention to the low load
subjects. In order to investigate the possibility that end-of-game behavior is a¤ected by past
outcomes, we o¤er three specications for both treatments. In regressions (1) and (4), we
analyze data from periods 3 through 30.31 In regressions (2) and (5), we analyze the same
data but we include a dummy variable indicating whether the observation came from the last
5 periods. In regressions (3) and (6), we exclude data obtained from the last 5 periods. This
analysis is summarized in Table 5.
31Periods 1 and 2 do not contain observations with a two period lag.
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Table 5. Restricted random-e¤ects logistic regressions of cooperation
High load treatment Low load treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Others X in t  1  0:106  0:114  0:0118  0:0387  0:179  0:171
(0:111) (0:111) (0:101) (0:134) (0:133) (0:145)
Subject X in t  1  0:314  0:334  0:173  0:252  0:440  0:544
(0:338) (0:323) (0:383) (0:345) (0:331) (0:427)
Others X in t  1* 0:425 0:440 0:382 0:375 0:401 0:458
Subject X in t  1 (0:179) (0:181) (0:188) (0:158) (0:160) (0:211)
Others X in t  2  0:147  0:156  0:131  0:0089  0:111  0:089
(0:170) (0:174) (0:184) (0:0880) (0:0604) (0:0896)
Subject X in t  2 0:0617 0:046 0:169  0:0232  0:148  0:114
(0:384) (0:385) (0:390) (0:211) (0:112) (0:0643)
Others X in t  2* 0:0139 0:023  0:0171 0:178 0:191 0:155
Subject X in t  2 (0:227) (0:229) (0:218) (0:0822) (0:081) (0:110)
Last 5    0:148      1:062  
(0:129) (0:201)
QIC 1044:30 1044:85 855:78 739:05 731:18 627:67
Observations 784 784 644 560 560 460
We provide the coe¢ cient estimates with standard errors in parentheses, where
* indicates signicance at 0.1, ** indicates signicance at 0.05, and *** indicates
signicance at 0.01. Each regression accounts for the repeated observations by
assuming an exchangeable log odds ratio clustered by group and subclustered by
subject. Regressions (1) and (2) have 784 observations from 28 subjects in 28
periods. Regression (3) has 644 observations from 28 subjects in 23 periods. Re-
gressions (4) and (5) have 560 observations from 20 subjects in 28 periods. Re-
gression (6) has 460 observations from 20 subjects in 23 periods. QIC refers to the
Quasi-likelihood information criterion.
First, we note that the t  1 interaction term is signicant in every specication for both
cognitive load treatments. However, we note that neither of the other t   1 variables are
signicant in any of the regressions. Here we nd evidence that the high load and the low
load subjects conditioned their play on both the number of other cooperators in the previous
period and their own play in the previous period. Second, we note that in every specication
of the low load regressions, at least one t   2 variable is signicant. In regressions (4) and
(5) the t   2 interaction variable is signicant. Additionally, in regression (5) the Others X
in t   2 variable is signicant and in regression (6), Subject X in t   2 is signicant. On the
other hand, none of the three high load specications exhibit a signicant t   2 coe¢ cient.
This suggests that the low load subjects were able to condition their play on a greater number
17
of variables related to previous outcomes, even when controlling for the end of play. Third,
as expected from the previous analysis, the Last 5 coe¢ cient is signicant in the Low load
regressions but not in the High load regressions. We summarize the new insights from this
analysis with the following result.
Result 3: There is evidence that the low load subjects were better able than high load
subjects to condition their play on variables related to previous outcomes.
4 Conclusion
So are there brains in games? Our results suggest a qualied "yes." Given our manipulation
of the availability of cognitive resources in our particular strategic environment, we found
that di¤erences in cognitive resources implied di¤erences in strategic behavior. We found that
behavior of both high and low load subjects in the multi-player prisoners dilemma converged
to the SPNE behavior. We also found that the low load subjects exhibited more strategic
defection near the end of play. Additionally, we found evidence that the low load subjects
were better able to condition their behavior on previous outcomes.
We note that previous research (Jones, 2008) has found a positive relationship between
measures of cognitive ability and cooperation in repeated prisoners dilemma games, played
without a denite last period. However, we do not nd strong evidence that the cognitive
load treatment is signicantly related to cooperative behavior in our regressions. Perhaps we
do not nd such a relationship since we studied behavior in the nitely repeated prisoners
dilemma game. It is possible that if we studied behavior in the prisoners dilemma game,
without a denite last period, then we would nd a signicant treatment variable.
The relationship between cognitive resources and play in games is also of interest to
researchers who study nonequilibrium models. In response to the mounting evidence that
subjects rarely play according to the equilibrium predictions, researchers have been turning
their attention to nonequilibrium models which can account for hierarchical levels of think-
ing (Camerer et al., 2004; Costa-Gomes, et al. 2001). It would seem natural to expect that
the cognitive ability of the subject would be related to the level of strategic sophistication of
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the subject. However, Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2010) found that the mapping of mea-
sures of cognitive ability to the estimated hierarchical level of thinking varied across games.
While there could be other reasons for this negative result,32 evidence of this kind is crucial in
supporting existing nonequilibrium models or in suggesting modications to existing models.
Whereas the repeated nature of our experiment does not provide direct evidence related to the
cognitive hierarchy literature, our paper suggests that it could be fruitful to investigate the
relationship between the nonequilibrium models and the cognitive ability of subjects, through
the application of a di¤erential cognitive load.
There remain several interesting and unanswered questions. For instance, it is unclear
how our results would be a¤ected by an increase (i.e., a public goods game or auction) or
a decrease (i.e., a two-player prisoners dilemma) in the complexity of the game. Another
unanswered question relates to the signicance of the incentives regarding the memorization
task. While our cognitive load manipulation was successful, and we did not nd evidence of an
income e¤ect, it is possible that the subjects were motivated by di¤erences in payments across
treatments. Also note that we only applied a cognitive load during the stage in which the
subjects selected an action in the game. We conjecture that our results would be strengthened
if the load was applied during both the game decision stage and the feedback stage. We hope
that future work can address these matters.
Finally, we note that the cognitive load manipulation is possibly helpful in any setting
in which cognitive constraints a¤ect behavior. Consider the rational inattention literature.33
These models assume that decision makers are unable to process all of the available infor-
mation, however they optimally allocate their attention in order to make decisions. In our
experiment, we provide evidence of the e¤ects of these constraints, in that subjects under a
smaller cognitive load were better able to condition their play on the outcomes of previous
periods. The results of our experiment suggest that manipulating the ability to process infor-
mation via cognitive load could be a productive supplement to e¤orts in observing behavior
32See Crawford, Costa-Gomes, and Iriberri (2013).
33See Sims (2003) for an early reference. See Dahremöller and Fels (2012), Mackowiak and Wiederholt
(2009), Persson (2012), and Reis (2006) for subsequent e¤orts. Also see Wiederholt (2010) for an overview of
the eld.
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consistent with rational inattention.34 ;35
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